


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)  
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (DIA)  
Colonel Paul E. Pique, USA (ACSI)  
Captain G. K. Nicodemus, USN (ONI)  
Colonel A. E. Stoll, USAF (AFCIN 2B2)



25X1

SUBJECT : USIB MEMORANDUM ON COMMUNIST CHINESE  
GROUND CAPABILITIES AGAINST INDIA

1. At their meeting of 30 January the USIB directed that a coordinated paper on the Chinese Communist ground capabilities against India be produced. The attached draft terms of reference on this subject are forwarded for review.

2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1000 Thursday, 7 February 1963 at CIA Headquarters to discuss these terms.



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Acting Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

DISTRIBUTION B

NSA, DIA reviews completed

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1 February 1963

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: Communist Chinese Ground  
Capabilities Against India

THE PROBLEM

To assess the offensive capabilities of Communist China's  
ground forces against India.

I. QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. What general political/military/economic considera-  
tions affect directly the Chinese Communists' military capa-  
bilities against India -- e.g., the need to commit large  
forces in the Taiwan Strait area, the need to maintain inter-  
nal security or the degree of support (or lack of it) that  
the Chinese can expect from the USSR?

B. Exclusive of logistic considerations, how does  
geography affect Chinese capabilities with respect to weapons,  
personnel and tactics in the area?

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C. Examine the capacity of the Chinese Communists to support ground campaigns against India, considering separately the following objectives:

1. Active border guard activities;
2. Limited probing action (similar to the action of last October and November);
3. Invasion to secure major portion of Indian territory.

(It is suggested that Chinese Communist logistic problems be discussed in three phases: (1) The Chinese interior to the Tibetan base areas, (2) from the base areas to the frontier, and (3) the area on the Indian side of the frontier.)

## II. GRAPHICS

What maps, other graphics and tabular materials will be required?

## III. POST-MORTEM COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

What significant gaps in intelligence information have become apparent in the preparation of this contribution?

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